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The JOBS Act: Unintended Consequences of
the “Facebook Bill”
Tyler Adam*

The Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”), in part, amended § 12(g)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Originally enacted to impose mandatory
disclosure requirements on non-reporting companies with a significant volume
of trading, § 12(g) became dysfunctional due to changes in the market
landscape. The JOBS Act amended § 12(g), first, by raising the shareholders of
record threshold, and second, by excluding from the threshold number persons
who received securities pursuant to certain employee compensation plans. This
note argues that the JOBS Act’s retooling of § 12(g) fails to adequately resolve
fundamental problems with the rule. Specifically, the amendments will promote
a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory disclosure triggering requirements,
which will enable public companies to manipulate the rule. Additionally, it will
reduce the number of IPOs, which is not the best policy for spurring job growth
and economic growth. These unintended consequences can be avoided by
changing the § 12(g) triggering requirements to a two-tiered approach that
regulates the private and public spheres using different metrics. These metrics
should reflect trading volumes and beneficial ownership of public and private
companies, respectively.

* J.D. Candidate, 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I would like to
thank Professor Abraham J.B. Cable for his insight and contributions, without which this note
would not have been possible. Additionally, I am grateful to my family for their unending
support.
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I. INTRODUCTION

On April 5, 2012, President Barack Obama signed the Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act (“JOBS Act”). The JOBS Act is intended to
stimulate job creation and economic growth by improving the ability of
emerging growth companies to gain access to the public capital
markets. 1 In part, the JOBS Act amended § 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 2 (“1934 Act”).
Prior to the JOBS Act, § 12(g) required any securities issuer with
total assets exceeding $10 million 3 and a class of nonexempted
securities held of record by five hundred or more to file a registration
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”). 4
Although § 12(g) does not require companies to list shares on the
public markets, once a company is required to register with the SEC, it
may be induced to go public to benefit from being able to raise capital
on the public markets. 5 Therefore, the rule effectively forces
companies meeting its requirement to initiate an initial public offering
(“IPO”). 6
The JOBS Act amended § 12(g), first, by raising the shareholders
of record threshold from 500 to either 2,000 persons, or 500 persons
who are not accredited investors (the “Threshold Provision”). 7 Second,
the Act further expanded the § 12(g) mandatory registration threshold
by excluding persons who received securities pursuant to employee
compensation plans in transactions exempted from the registration
requirements of § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). 8 The
Threshold Provision of the JOBS Act has been referred to as the
“Facebook Bill” 9 because leading up to its initial registration with the
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, H.R. 3606, 112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012).
2. Id.
3. See Relief from Reporting by Small Insurers, Exchange Act Release No. 37157 (May 8,
1996).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (West 2011).
5. Steven M. Davidoff, Facebook May Be Forced to Go Public Amid Market Gloom, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/facebook-may-beforced-to-go-public-amid-market-gloom/.
6. See id.
7. H.R. 3606, § 501.
8. Id. The Threshold Provision incorporates the basic premises of two bills that were
moving through the Houses, which, similarly, sought to increase the minimum record shareholder
threshold requirement (S. 1824, 112 Cong. and H.R. 2167, 112th Cong.). Although H.R. 3606 is the
session law at issue in this note, fundamentally, each of these bills sought to increase the
registration threshold. Therefore this note cites to legislative history of each of them.
9. Garett Sloane, Facebook Bill Gets A Boost, N.Y. POST (Dec. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/business/facebook_bill_gets_boost_aVqLy3FrOzDMdy3Ryc5v8
K.
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Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on February 1, 2012, 10
the 500-shareholder rule was cited as a reason Facebook would be
forced to register with the SEC. 11
Creating legislation that makes capital formation easier has been
one of President Obama’s key objectives. 12 Upon signing the JOBS Act,
Obama articulated that the bill will make it easier for companies to go
public, which is an “important step towards expanding and hiring more
Proponents of increasing the § 12(g) mandatory
workers.” 13
registration threshold argued that it was outdated and unnecessarily
impeded capital formation for startup companies. 14 Their hope is that
the changes to § 12(g) will alleviate challenges to capital formation and
spur job growth. 15
In recent years, companies have faced a difficult financing
landscape. To begin, startup companies have limited financing
options: they can raise capital through borrowing or equity financing. 16
In the wake of the 2008 economic crisis, borrowing has become
difficult because banks have tightened their lending standards. 17 As a
result, equity financing is increasingly essential for startups to gain
capital. 18 One form of equity financing is conducting an IPO.
Companies typically enter the public markets in order to gain access to
capital necessary to hire employees and expand business operations. 19
An IPO represents a significant step in a young company’s growth
cycle. 20 However, the equity financing process in the public markets
has become more burdensome in recent years due to increased
regulations. 21 As a result, the number of IPOs has decreased. 22
A report published in August 2011 indicated that since 1991, the

10. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) (Feb. 1, 2012).
11. See Dan Primack, Killing The 500-Shareholder Rule, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2011),
http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/08/ending-the-500-shareholder-rule.
12. State of the Union 2012: Obama Speech Transcript, WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2012), available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/state-of-the-union-2012-obama-speech-excerpts/
2012/01/24/gIQA9D3QOQstory4.html.
13. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by the President at JOBS Act Bill
Signing (Apr. 5, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-andvideo/video/ 2012/04/05/president-obama-signs-jobs-act#transcript).
14. H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 2 (2011), 2011 WL 6184472.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. IPO TASK FORCE, REBUILDING THE IPO ON-RAMP: PUTTING EMERGING COMPANIES AND THE JOB
MARKET BACK ON THE ROAD TO GROWTH 1 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/
smallbus/acsec/rebuilding_the_ipo_on-ramp.pdf.
20. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 9.
21. See Id. “Unfortunately, a series of rules, regulation and other compliance issues aimed at
large-cap, already-public companies has increased the time and costs required for emerging
companies to take [the critical first step of doing an IPO].”
22. Id. at 1.
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number of emerging growth companies conducting IPOs declined
dramatically relative to historic levels. 23 From 1991 to 2002, IPOs
averaged 530 per year. 24 In contrast, there were only 38 IPOs in 2008
and 61 in 2009. 25 Furthermore, between 1995 and 2010, the number
of public companies listed on the U.S. stock exchanges fell from 8,000
to 5,000, while the number of listings on non-U.S. exchanges increased
from 23,000 to 40,000. 26 This trend has been referred to as “The Great
Depression in Listings.” 27
Reinvigorating the IPO market is vital to rejuvenating the job
market because when companies raise money in the public markets
they gain the resources necessary to expand and grow their employee
base. A study of 136 IPOs of venture-backed companies from 1970 to
2009 found that, on average, 92 percent of job growth occurred postIPO. 28 The data represents the increase in the number of employees
stated in public filings at the time of IPO and in the latest year
available. 29 Given the correlation between job creation and IPOs, it
follows that the recent downturn in IPOs has had a staggering impact
on the U.S. job market. By one estimate, the decrease in companies
entering the public markets cost America as many as 22 million jobs
from 1997 through 2008. 30
Despite the fact that IPOs are ultimately beneficial in creating job
growth and maintaining robust public markets, for a company, going
public is a significant undertaking. The vast majority of small closely
held companies avoid going public because: (1) remaining private is
cheaper; (2) private companies are easier to operate; and (3)
remaining private ensures that the managers would not lose their
First, remaining private is cheaper because private
control. 31
companies avoid the costs of periodically reporting to regulatory

23. TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 1.
24. David Weild & David Kim, Market Structure is Causing the IPO Crisis – and More, in GRANT
THORNTON: CAPITAL MARKET SERIES 3 (2010), http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20
companies%20and%20capital%20markets/Files/IPO%20crisis%20%20June%202010%20%20FINAL. pdf [hereinafter Weild & Kim, Market Structure].
25. Weild & Kim, Market Structure.
26. EDWARD S. KNIGHT, SPURRING JOB GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL FORMATION WHILE PROTECTING
INVESTORS: HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 3 (Dec. 1, 2011)
(written testimony) [hereinafter Written Testimony of Edward Knight].
27. David Weild & Edward Kim, A Wake-Up Call for America, GRANT THORNTON: CAPITAL
MARKET SERIES, 4 (Nov. 2009), http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Public%20companies%
20and %20capital%20markets/gtwakeupcall.pdf [hereinafter Weild & Kim, A Wake-Up].
28. Id. at 26; Slideshow by the National Venture Capital Association, NVCA 4-Pillar Plan to
Restore Liquidity in the U.S. Venture Capital Industry, NVCA (Apr. 29/30, 2009), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/NVCA/nvca-4pillar-plan-to-restore-liquidity-in-the-us-venturecapital-indus-try-1360905.
29. Weild & Kim, A Wake-Up, supra note 27, at 26.
30. Id. at 26 exhibit 26.
31. JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION CASES AND MATERIAL 156 (6th ed. 2009).
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agencies, which requires expensive legal, financial, and accounting
services. Second, private companies are easier to operate because
boards of directors can make business decisions without having to get
approval from public shareholders. Third, when a company remains
private, the board members can act without the risk of being voted out
of their jobs by shareholders or losing their jobs by a hostile tender
offer.
In addition to the long-term financial and corporate governance
considerations described above, conducting an IPO is extremely
expensive. In 2007, the estimated costs for a significant IPO were
$600,000 to $800,000 in legal fees, $400,000 to $600,000 for auditor
fees, $150,000 to $200,000 in printing costs, and various filing fees. 32
Underwriter commissions take a percent of the offering amount. 33
Furthermore, the senior officers will devote a significant amount of
time to matters related to the offering instead of focusing on routine
business activities. 34
Upon recommending increasing the § 12(g) threshold, the House
Committee on Financial Services articulated that the difficulty in
borrowing coupled with the regulatory roadblocks for companies
trying to enter the pubic markets has lead to an increased use of preIPO equity financing. 35 As a result, there has been an expansion in the
number of shareholders of record in pre-IPO companies. 36 Therefore,
the pre-JOBS Act § 12(g) requirements inhibited companies from
accomplishing their financing needs without risking being required to
register with the SEC, which they may not have be strategically or
financially prepared to do. 37
Although the Threshold Provision is well intended in its attempt
to update § 12(g) to better reflect current market practices, this note
argues that due to the way it is crafted, the Threshold Provision will
have harmful unintended consequences. These consequences include
promoting a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory disclosure
triggering requirements and reducing the number of companies
conducting IPOs. The later consequence will have the opposite
intended effect of the JOBS Act legislation because it will hinder job
creation and economic growth. Part II explores the historical purpose
of § 12(g) and how it became dysfunctional. Part III discusses some of
the arguments for updating § 12(g). Part IV presents some of the
unintended consequences of the Threshold Provision. Finally, Part V
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

COX ET AL., supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 112-327, at 2.
See id.
Id.
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recommends changes to § 12(g) that would help to avoid some of the
unintended pitfalls of the Threshold Provision while creating a
regulatory environment that encourages entrepreneurship, enables
capital formation, and fosters job creation and economic growth.

II. THE HISTORIC CONTEXT OF SECTION 12(G) AND ITS FAILURE
AS AN ACCURATE SIZE TEST

A. SECTION 12(G) WAS CREATED TO REGULATE THE OVER-THE-COUNTER
SECURITIES MARKETS
The securities laws were promulgated in response to the
economic crisis resulting from the Great Depression. 38 While many of
the causes of the 1929 market crash were unrelated to abusive
practices, 39 evidence indicates that false and misleading information
adversely affected the stock prices. 40 Such abusive practices were in
part a result of a lack of any laws requiring publicly traded firms to
make public disclosures of material information, including financial
reports. 41 Additionally, investor interest had disappeared almost
immediately in the wake of the stock market crash of 1929. 42 For
instance, at their high point in 1929 prior to the crash, New York Stock
Exchange listed securities had a total value of $89 billion, and their
value dipped to $15 billion by 1932. 43 Therefore, because there had
been market fraud preceding the Great Depression, and a significant
amount of investors withdrew their capital during the Great
Depression, there was a pressing need to eliminate fraud and
reinvigorate investor confidence in the public markets. 44
In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, recommending the
federal regulation of investment securities, President Roosevelt wrote:
There is . . . an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of new
securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by
full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying
public. This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the

38. JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39 (3d ed. 2003).
39. For example, speculative investor frenzy and significant amounts of margin trading
played a substantial role in causing the crash. COX ET AL., supra note 31, at 5.
40. Id. at 6.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 277
(1991).
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further doctrine ‘let the seller also beware.’ It puts the burden of
telling the whole truth on the seller. It should give impetus to honest
dealing in securities and thereby bring back public confidence. 45

Two bodies of law were enacted to regulate the securities
industry: the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. The 1933 Act operates to
protect investors in primary distributions of securities, while the 1934
Act regulates trading markets and their participants. 46
Since their enactment, the cornerstone of the federal securities
laws has been mandatory disclosure. 47 The primary and longstanding
mission of the SEC is to compel firms involved in the securities markets
to disclose data, and thereby indirectly induce them to avoid illegal or
embarrassing activities. 48 Mandatory disclosure is generally regarded
as the appropriate way to regulate corporate finance. 49 Based on the
philosophy of mandatory disclosure, the current formulation of the
1934 Act mandates continuous disclosure for three categories of
companies: (1) companies that have securities listed on a national
exchange; (2) companies that meet the requirements of § 12(g); and
(3) companies that have an effective 1933 Act registration statement.50
This note addresses what the rationale is for forcing private companies
to report material information to the public, and what the criteria
under § 12(g) should be for doing so. To frame the discussion, it is
important to understand some the benefits of mandatory disclosure as
well as the context in which the SEC created § 12(g).
1. A Case for Mandatory Disclosure
The policy of mandatory disclosure was not originally aimed at
having a significant regulatory effect on the economy. 51 Rather,
President Roosevelt approached mandatory disclosure as a mechanism
for stymieing the deleterious behavior of Wall Street insiders by
exposing their activities to public scrutiny. 52 Roosevelt was influenced
by, and often cited to, the regulatory philosophy articulated by Justice
Brandeis that, “Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman.” 53 Nonetheless, mandatory
disclosure has also come to be viewed as a valuable mechanism for
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

S. REP. NO. 73-47, at 6–7 (1933).
COX ET AL., supra note 31, at 7.
Id.
SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 39–40.
Id. at 40. For a more complete discussion of the rationales for mandatory disclosure see
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 276–314.
50. COX ET AL., supra note 31, at 7–8.
51. SELIGMAN, supra note 38 at 39–40.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 41–42.
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regulating the overall economy because it “improves the ‘allocative
efficiency’ of the capital market.” 54
Mandatory disclosure creates economic efficiency because, in
effect, society is subsidizing “search costs to secure both a greater
quantity of information and a better testing of its accuracy.” 55 As a
result, society gains equal access to information, without which
investors would spend time and money trying to beat the market. 56 In
the aggregate, the time investors would spend trying to search out
information to beat the market would be very costly. Therefore,
“investors as a group gain if firms disclose so as to minimize the
opportunities for these gains and thus the incentives to search.” 57 The
time and money, which would otherwise be spent searching for
information, can be spent on other endeavors.
Another important economic benefit to mandatory disclosure is
that by disclosing information, firms gain more investors. They do so
because, by reducing investors’ information costs, investors increase
the net returns on their investments:
The net return on a security is its gross return (dividends plus any
liquidating distribution) less the costs of information and
transaction in holding the security. A firm can increase this net
return as easily by reducing the cost of holding the stock as by
increasing its business profits. Firms that promise to make
disclosures for this purpose will prosper relative to others, because
their investors incur relatively lower costs and can be more passive
with safety. 58

Theoretically, this logic indicates that companies have a business
incentive to voluntarily disclose, and therefore mandating disclosure is
not necessary. However, in reality, there are several factors that
change the equation and necessitate mandatory disclosure.
Mandatory disclosure is necessary because it has been shown that
a company will only voluntarily disclose all its information if three
assumptions are satisfied: (1) investors know that companies have
particular information; (2) companies cannot lie; and (3) disclosure is
costless. 59 For example, if the cost of disclosure outweighs the benefit
to the company, or if disclosure is not economically feasible, then the
company will either choose not to disclose or to only partially disclose
54. John C. Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic Case for Mandatory Disclosure System, 70
VA. L. REV. 717, 722 (1984).
55. Coffee, supra note 54.
56. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 287.
57. Id. at 290.
58. Id.
59. Luigi Zingales, The Costs and Benefits of Financial Market 18 (ECGI Law Working Paper
No.
21/2004),
available
at
http://www.cgscenter.com/library/CorpGovCompValue/
CostbenefitofFinMarket Evaluation.pdf.
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the information. 60 Alternatively, if the company has information it
knows will negatively impact the stock value, but knows that the public
will not find out about it, then it will not voluntarily disclose such
negative information. 61 Although a company will generally benefit
from disclosure, it will only disclose enough information it can
internalize a benefit from. 62 Because, as the above examples show,
there are social benefits to disclosure that companies cannot
internalize, companies will not be incentivized to provide a socially
optimal amount of information. 63 Therefore, it is necessary to mandate
disclosure.
In sum, the policy of mandatory disclosure has numerous social
and economic benefits. These factors are important to take into
account when balancing the interest of private companies in not
registering with the public interest of requiring companies to register.
Part II.A(2) discusses the historic context for the creation of § 12(g)
and SEC’s rationale for the § 12(g) technical requirements.
2.

The Origin of Section 12(g)
Section 12(g) was adopted in 1964 based primarily on a
congressionally commissioned SEC study (“the Study”) 64 concluding
that securities traded on over-the-counter-markets (“OTC”), i.e.,
nonreporting securities exchanges, should, in a limited fashion, be
brought under the purview of the SEC. 65 The Study reviewed the
efficacy of the regulatory scheme of the 1933 and 1934 Acts in order
“to strengthen the mechanisms facilitating the free flow of capital into
the markets and to raise the standards of investor protection, thus
preserving and enhancing the level of investor confidence.” 66 As part
of the study, the SEC surveyed every case of fraud under the 1933 and
1934 Acts, either in litigation or otherwise, that came before the SEC in
a period of eighteen months beginning in January 1961. 67 Ninety-three
percent of the 107 broker dealer revocation cases reviewed involved
issuers of securities that were not subject to the continuous reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act. 68 Furthermore, numerous reports
indicated that companies trading OTC and not subject to the
registration and reporting requirements of the 1934 Act were either
60. Zingales, supra note 59.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 19.
63. Zingales, supra note 59, at 19.
64. H.R. REP. NO. 88-1418, at 15 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3013, 3027; 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 78l(g) (West 2011).
65. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 60–64 (1963).
66. Id. at iv.
67. Id. at 10.
68. Id.
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making no disclosures to their investors, or their disclosures were
generally inadequate to the point of being misleading. 69
The Study determined that to the extent that companies have
“traded over-the-counter issues outstanding are allowed to operate in
the dark, the very conditions that encourage a resort to fraud and
manipulation are fostered” 70 Therefore, the basic principles for
establishing investor protections for listed securities are equally
applicable to the OTC market. 71 For the reasons discussed below, the
SEC’s solution was to require companies of a certain size to register
and report periodically with the SEC. 72
Based on data gathered from 1,618 companies listed in the OTC
markets, the SEC determined what the appropriate benchmark would
be for requiring private companies to register. 73 The participants
included 96 insurance companies, 358 banks, and 1,164 industrial and
other corporations. 74 Of these, 1,610 provided their number of
shareholders. 75 The shareholder numbers were established in terms of
record holdings, as opposed to beneficial shareholders. 76 This is an
important distinction in the development of § 12(g). Record
shareholders are people or entities listed on the corporate record of
the security, whereas the beneficial owners are those who own the
shares in equity even though the legal title belongs to the record
holder. For example, the record owner may have sold divisions of
shares to numerous people who would not be listed on the corporate
record of the security.
The study found a positive correlation between the number of
record shareholders and the number of transfers of record. 77 That is,
companies with a larger number of record shareholders saw higher
trading volumes. 78 The study ideally would have looked at trading
volumes in terms of actual trades, as opposed to transfers of record,
because significantly more transactions would have occurred without
the record actually transferring. 79 However, trading volumes were
unavailable, and an attempt to obtain them was not feasible. 80
Therefore, the number of record transfers was the next best indicator
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 10–17.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 19, 36.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 20–23.
Id.
Id. at 20 n.44.
Id.
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of market activity. 81 Likewise, the ideal criteria for forcing a firm into
the purview of the SEC would have been based on trading volumes
because market activity would have been the best benchmark for
determining the risk of investor fraud. 82 However, the study notes that
criteria based on market activity would not have been workable in
practice, and the number of shareholders of record is “at least a rough,
indirect measure of market activity.” 83 Presumably, this is because
there were no available records of trading volumes of over-the-counter
issues, and it would have been extremely burdensome for the SEC to
keep track of the number of record transfers taking place. 84
The Study found that the level of trading activity, based on record
transfers became significant for companies with 300 or more
shareholders. 85 Moreover, over half of the surveyed companies had
300 or more shareholders of record. 86 In light of the data, the study
recommended extending the 1934 Act’s disclosure, proxy, and insider
trading provisions to companies with 300 or more shareholders. 87 The
ultimate determination of a 500 shareholder threshold was a
compromise between the SEC, who wanted the threshold to be 300
shareholders, and members of the investment banking industry who
wanted the threshold set at 1,000 shareholders. 88

B. THE 500 SHAREHOLDER THRESHOLD BECAME A FLAWED SIZE TEST
The 500-shareholder limit is roughly a size test. 89 As discussed in
Part II.A(2), the study determined that companies of a certain size (in
terms of the number of record shareholders) traded at higher volumes
in the OTC markets, and, therefore, they should be accountable to their
shareholders and the public. 90 Since its creation in 1964, the 500shareholder metric has become dysfunctional because many
81. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 20 n.44.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 34.
86. Id. at 32. Additionally, the Study states, “it is clear also that under any definition of
‘public’ for purposes of protection of the securities laws, a company with 300 or more
shareholders of record is to be deemed public.” Id. at 34.
87. Id at 62; SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 314.
88. SELIGMAN, supra note 38, at 315.
89. DONALD C. LANGEVOORT & ROBERT B. THOMSON, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities
Regulation, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 23) (on file with authors).
90. See H.R. DOC. NO. 95 88-95, at 60–61. The SEC has the power under § 12(g)(5) to define
“held of record” as it sees necessary or appropriate in the public interest or to protect investors
against the circumvention of the provisions of § 12(g). 15 U.S.C § 78l (g)(5) (West 2012). The
Commission utilized this power to define “held of record” in SEC Release No. 34-7426 (1964). See
Exchange Act Release No. 7426 (proposed Sept. 14, 1964), Exchange Act Release No. 7492 (1965)
(adoption).
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extraordinarily large companies (in terms of total assets) have few
enough record shareholders to be able to avoid registering.91
Furthermore, many publicly traded companies have less than 500
record shareholders and less than $10 million of assets, but they have
thousands of beneficial holders. 92 As explained further below, these
publicly traded companies can choose to delist with the SEC even
though they have thousands of publicly traded shares outstanding.
When the SEC conducted the Study, they based their data on
shareholders of record and not beneficial record holders. 93 They noted
in their report that the data presumed an understated number of
However, this disparity has since
beneficial record holders. 94
dramatically increased because publicly traded shares are no longer
recorded in the names of individual owners. 95 Rather, broker-dealers
“hold vast numbers of shares of vast numbers of investors under a
single name.” 96 This practice developed as a practical matter to cut the
massive flow of paper and the costs of transferring stock that resulted
from increased trading volumes. 97 Because high speed trading
requires that securities are easily transferrable, as a matter of practice,
broker-dealers do not require the transfer of certificates every time
beneficial ownership changes. 98 Currently, it is “unusual for a
beneficial owner to appear on the corporate books as a holder of
record or hold a stock certificate.” 99 For example, a company with a
public float of $1 billion and 2,500 beneficial shareholders may still
have fewer than 500 shareholders of record. 100
Consequently, the failure of the § 12(g) as a size test has enabled
hundreds of companies to go dark. A company goes dark when it
deregisters its publicly traded securities with the SEC, yet continues to
trade on an OTC market. 101 Companies that deregister with the SEC are

91. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 23; JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS
FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL FORMATION: CAPITAL FORMATION, JOB CREATION AND CONGRESS:
PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC MARKETS BEFORE THE SEC 13–14 (Nov. 17, 2011) (written testimony)
[hereinafter Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr.].
92. Christian Leuz et al., Why Do Firms Go Dark? Causes and Economic Consequences of
Voluntary SEC Deregistrations 1 (University of Maryland - Robert H. Smith School of Business,
Working Paper No. RHS-06-045), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid= 592421.
93. H.R. DOC. NO. 88-95, at 20.
94. Id.
95. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 24.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 15.
99. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, et al., Petition for Commission Action to Require Exchange Act
Registration of Over-the-Counter Equity Securities, U.S. SEC (July 3, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/petn4-483.htm.
100. Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14.
101. See generally Leuz et al., supra note 92 (referring to the Abstract).
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described as having gone dark because, after they deregister, the
insiders of the company typically refuse to disclose any information to
public investors. 102 Under § 12(g)(4), a company may voluntarily
terminate registration ninety days after the issuer files a certificate
with the Commission showing that the number of record shareholders
is fewer than three hundred persons. 103 The company may also
voluntarily terminate registration if it has 500 holders of record but
less than $10 million of assets in each of the prior three years
preceding the deregistration request. 104 Furthermore, companies with
more than 300 shareholders of record can bring the number of record
shareholders below 300 by engineering a reverse stock split or a
repurchase tender offer. 105
Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis, and Tracy Wang conducted a
study (“Leuz Study”) analyzing a sample of approximately 480 firms
that went dark between 1998 and 2004. 106 The Leuz Study revealed
interesting insight about the going dark phenomena. The Leuz Study
companies had an average of $90.96 million in assets, with a median of
$3.36 million, and an average of $25.19 million in market value, with a
median of 3.96 million. 107 The study does not report the number of
beneficial record holders for each company. However, to put it in
perspective, many of the companies that have gone dark had
significant assets and more than 300 beneficial shareholders. 108 For
example, when United Road Services went dark in 2003, it had
approximately over 6,000 beneficial shareholders and $97,767,000 in
total assets. 109 Once deregistered, fewer than 10 percent of the Leuz
Study companies disclosed financial statements and even fewer were
audited. 110 The main motivation for companies to go dark was the high
cost of reporting. 111 By in large, the Leuz study found that “smaller
firms with relatively poor performance and low growth, for which
reporting costs are particularly burdensome, are more likely to go
dark, as are firms in the period following the passage of [the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002].” 112
On average there was a negative stock price reaction of -10
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Jesse M. Fried, Firms Gone Dark, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 136 (2009).
15 U.S.C. § 78l (g)(4) (West 2012).
Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99.
Fried, supra note 102, at 141.
Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 2.
Id. at 51–52.
Fried, supra note 102, at 145.
Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99.
Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 33.
Id. at 2.
Id.
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percent to firms’ decision to go dark. 113 The negative reaction may be
explained in two ways. First, the market’s strong negative reaction
may be attributed to shareholders inferring that the company’s future
growth prospects have diminished, even though the decision to go
dark may help the company trim administrative costs and thus
maximize value. 114 Second, the negative reaction could be explained by
agency costs, because the negative market reaction reflects an
anticipated increase in private control benefits. 115 These private
control benefits may include the managers’ ability to hide poor
performances that would otherwise lead to their dismissal, or
protection against legal liability. 116
Not only do companies that go dark experience a negative market
reaction, but going dark also increases the likelihood that investor
fraud and other manipulative behavior may take place. The SEC warns
that stocks traded “in the OTC market are generally among the most
risky and most susceptible to manipulation.” 117 When investors are
deprived of periodic reporting under the 1934 Act, the stocks trade on
“rumor, innuendo and uncertainty.” 118 The informational asymmetry
and increased volatility leaves investors susceptible to the
unscrupulous behavior of insiders who are well positioned to deprive
investors of the remaining value of their investments. 119
The Threshold Provision did not change the requirements that
allow most firms to deregister. 120 Nonetheless, the problem of
companies going dark demonstrates the serious inadequacy of using
the number of record holders as a benchmark for a company’s size.
The Threshold Provision will only promulgate this flawed standard.
Additionally, the issue of companies going dark reflects the perils of
discretionary reporting because it demonstrates that when the costs of
reporting outweigh the benefits, companies will not report. Moreover,
reporting is needed to protect investors against fraud precisely in the
situations where it is not desirable for a company to report. Therefore,
a different standard is necessary for determining when registration
should be mandated.
113. Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 3.
116. Id.
117. Pump&Dump.com: Tips for Avoiding Stock Scams on the Internet, U.S. SEC, http://www.sec.
gov/investor/pubs/pump.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
118. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99, at 6.
119. Id.
120. The JOBS Act increases the deregistration threshold in the case of banks or a bank holding
companies to 1,200 persons. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306 (2012).
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III. ARGUMENTS FOR UPDATING SECTION 12(G)

In early December, a group of thirty eight executives and
investors, including Twitter CEO Dick Costolo and Gilt CEO Kevin Ryan
wrote a letter to Congress in support of the JOBS Act, stating that
“‘[t]he 500 shareholder rule is outdated, overly restrictive, and limits
U.S. job creation and American global competitiveness.’” 121 Proponents
of the Act proffered two changes to the startup landscape that support
overhauling § 12(g). First, unlike the companies of 1964, the pay
structures in current startups generally involve giving employees stock
options. 122 However, to stay within the 500 record holder threshold,
companies are faced with the choice of limiting the number of
employees they hire, the number of new investors they take on, or
their ability to acquire other businesses for stock. 123 Second, the
emergence of secondary markets, such as Sharespost and
SecondMarket, has created an alternative liquidity opportunity for
investors and employees. 124 Arguably, these secondary markets
encourage more private investment in startups because they provide
confidence for early stage investors that they will have multiple exit
options. 125 I will address these two matters separately.

A. EMPLOYEE EQUITY COMPENSATION
Upon introducing the Act, Representative David Schweikert
explained, “‘[i]f a company is really growing, it could start to hit its
500-shareholder limit just from its employee base.’” 126 Notably, the
500-shareholder threshold contributed to the IPO’s of Microsoft,
Google, and Facebook. 127 Although the use of equity compensation has

121. Douglas MacMillan & Joshua Gallu, Twitter, Gilt CEOs Fight SEC’s 500-Shareholder Rule for
Startups, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/ news/201112-14/twitter-gilt-ceos-fight-sec-s-500-shareholder-rule-for-startups.html.
122. BARRY E. SILBERT, LEGIS. PROPOSALS TO FACILITATE SMALL BUS. CAPITAL FORMATION AND JOB
CREATION: HEARING BEFORE THE H. COMM. ON FIN. SERV. 14 (Sept. 21, 2011) (written testimony),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/092111silbert.pdf [hereinafter
Written Testimony of Barry Silbert].
123. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122.
124. ERIC KOESTER, THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL FORMATION: HEARING BEFORE H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOV’T REFORM 7 (May 10, 2011) (written testimony), available at http://
democrats.oversight.house.gov/images/stories/FULLCOM/510%20future%20of%20cap%20for
m/Koester%20-%20House%20Oversight%20Testimony.pdf [hereinafter Written Testimony of
Eric Koester].
125. See Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7; see Written Testimony of Barry
Silbert, supra note 122, at 7.
126. Deborah Gage, Bill Aims to Loosen Private-Company Stock Rules, WALL ST. J. BLOGS (June 14,
2011 6:00 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2011/06/14/read-the-bill-designed-toloosen-private-stock-rules.
127. Peter Lattman, Share Rules Could Prompt an Offering by Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28,
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been problematic for some companies, the argument that a company’s
employee base is a major threat to a company’s record shareholder
count is a bit misleading for two reasons. First, it is not commonplace
for companies to be forced to go public due to § 12(g). Second, not all
employee equity holders are counted towards the § 12(g) threshold.
First, it is uncommon for companies to be forced to go public due
to reaching the § 12(g) threshold. 128 Given that thousands of publicly
traded companies have fewer than 300 record holders, or 500 record
holders and less than $10 million in assets at the end of their three
most recent fiscal years, 129 it is likely that many companies have less
than 500 shareholders of record at the time they enter the public
markets. For example, at the time of its IPO, Amazon.com, Inc.
reported having seventy-six record holders of its common stock. 130
Second, the SEC has already carved out exceptions to § 12(g) for
certain employee benefits plans, including stock options. In 1965, the
SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-1(a), which exempts employee
stock from the provisions of § 12(g). 131 Then, in 1988, the SEC adopted
Rule 701, 132 which provides an issuer exemption to the 1934 Act
registration requirements for securities offerings in compensatory
benefits plans. 133 In the 1980’s private non-reporting companies
began compensating employees with stock options to attract and
motivate employees. 134 As the practice grew from 1990 until 2006, a
number
of
companies
exceeded
the
§ 12(g) 500 shareholder threshold due to issuing stock options. 135 In

2010), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/focus-on-private-shares-could-push-a-publicoffering/; Primack, supra note 11.
128. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 42.
129. See Leuz et al., supra note 92, at 14–15.
130. Amazon.com, Inc., Amendment No. 5 to Form S-1 Registration Statement Under The
Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1/A) 59 (May 14, 1997). Note, Amazon.com, Inc. did not report
the number of record holders of its preferred stock.
131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12h-1(a) (West 2012) (“[a]ny interest or participation in an employee
stock bonus, stock purchase, profit sharing, pension, retirement, incentive, thrift, savings or
similar plan which is not transferable by the holder except in the event of death or mental
incompetency, or any security issued solely to fund such plans.”).
132. 17 C.F.R. § 230.701 (West 2012).
133. Id. § 230.701(c) (West 2012) (exempting registration requirements for securities
offerings in compensatory benefits plans to “employees, directors, general partners, trustees
(where the issuer is a business trust), officers, or consultants and advisors, and their family
members who acquire such securities from such persons through gifts or domestic relations
orders”).
134. U.S. SEC, RELEASE NO. 34-56887, EXEMPTION OF COMPENSATORY EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS FROM
REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12(G) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 5–6 (2007).
135. See, e.g., id. at 4 n.7 (citing the “no-action letters to Starbucks Corporation (available Apr.
2, 1992); Kinko’s, Inc. (available Nov. 30, 1999); Mitchell International Holding, Inc. (available
Dec. 27, 2000) (“Mitchell International”); AMIS Holdings, Inc. (available Jul. 30, 2001) (“AMIS
Holdings”); Headstrong Corporation (available Feb. 28, 2003); and VG Holding Corporation
(available Oct. 31, 2006) (“VG Holding”)).
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response to a series of no-action letters exempting these companies
from the § 12(g) requirements, on December 10, 2007, the SEC
amended the §12h-1 to exempt stock options for issuers not subject to
the Exchange Act’s reporting requirements. 136
Despite the SEC’s carve outs for employee equity compensation, a
company’s employee base can still contribute to the § 12(g) threshold
because the SEC’s exemption of stock options from § 12(g) does not
apply to securities issued upon the exercise of a stock option. 137 The
standard vesting time period used by startup companies for founders
and non-founders employee stock options is four years. 138 Because, in
the new IPO market, companies may take nearly a decade to go public,
option holders are often fully vested and may exercise their options
before the IPO event. 139 If the employees exercise their options, they
are counted as shareholders of record for purpose of § 12(g). 140 As a
result, § 12(g) discourages companies fearful of reaching the 500
shareholder threshold from hiring more employees and providing
equity-based compensation. 141 Furthermore, as explained in the Part
III.B, with the rise of secondary markets for trading private equity,
option holders may be increasingly inclined to exercise their options
prior to an IPO.
B. SECONDARY MARKETS
Changing the § 12(g) threshold had considerable support from
proponents of secondary market exchanges. 142 Trading on the private
markets has increased dramatically in recent years. 143 In 2010, the

136. U.S. SEC, RELEASE NO. 34-56887, supra note 134, at 4–5.
137. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12.
138. Doug Collom, Vesting of Founders’ Stock: Beyond the Basics, THE ENTREPRENEUR’S REPORT:
PRIVATE COMPANY FINANCING TRENDS (Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, Palo Alto, CA.), Spring
2008, at 9, available at http://www.wsgr.com/PDFSearch/vftrends0608.pdf.
139. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12.
140. Id.
141. Written Testimony of Barry Silbert, supra note 122, at 12.
142. See id. It is important to note that there is some skepticism about the sustainability of the
secondary markets in the wake of the Facebook IPO, which was the most actively traded company
on the private markets by a wide margin. Elevelyn Rusli & Peter Lattman, Losing a Goose That
Laid the Golden Egg, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/losingthe-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg/. Moreover, Zynga, Groupon, and LinkedIn were each
companies that were widely traded on private exchanges and recently went public. Id.
Nonetheless, representatives of the private exchanges believe that there is room to grow and that
other companies will emerge and fill the void created by the Facebook, and other recent, IPOs. Id.
For instance, Gregg Brogger, the president and founder of SharesPost stated, “We certainly expect
a reduction in revenue, but we also expect some companies like DropBox to step in . . . . Venture
capitalists always have another generation of new start-ups, and our market will as well.” Id.
143. Steven Russolillo, Public Problem: Private Markets Grapple With Tech IPOs, WALL ST. J., Oct.
31, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203687504576655311056016704.
html.
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value of all private share transactions was $4.6 billion, an increase
from the $2.4 billion in 2009. 144 These numbers were estimated to
keep increasing. 145 Eric Koester, former securities lawyer and current
chief operating officer of startup company Zaarly, explained that from
entrepreneurs’ perspective, the private markets are beneficial because
they offer an alternative option for providing liquidity to employees
and investors in late stage businesses that are not ready to sell their
companies or enter the public markets. 146
At a time when companies are taking longer to IPO due to
increasing costs of public company compliance and offerings, the
secondary markets provide confidence for early stage investors that
they will be able to exit. 147 They also provide greater visibility and
market pricing into the valuation of the business. 148 In this sense, they
create an onramp for the ultimate goal of going public. Companies
benefit from this new onramp because they can have a longer period to
mature before going public, and insiders and investors seeking short
term liquidity can access it on the secondary markets. The 500 record
shareholder threshold hinders this process because it forces
companies out into the public markets when they would otherwise
benefit from a longer incubation period.
However, there is skepticism about the public benefit of these
secondary markets and increasing the § 12(g) to enable them. For
example, Professor John Coffee argues that increasing the § 12(g)
threshold primarily serves the interests of the private equity brokers
without creating new jobs. 149 Professor Coffee explains that increasing
the § 12(g) threshold allows private equity brokers “to service not just
small companies as they grow, but much larger companies that are
discouraging their shareholders from holding record ownership.” 150
Therefore, raising the § 12(g) threshold exclusively benefits those
seeking to avoid the § 12(g) requirements. 151
Additionally, a rule that generates more trading in the secondary
markets could increase the likelihood of fraud and reduce investor
confidence in the public markets. The emergence of the private equity
trading platforms has been described as creating a “situation notunlike the pre-1964 period in which there are companies with widelytraded secondary shares which are outside of the periodic disclosure
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Russolillo, supra note 143.
Id.
Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7.
Id.
Written Testimony of Eric Koester, supra note 124, at 7.
Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14.
Id.
Id.
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requirements of the 1934 Act.” 152 Granted, private trading on the
secondary markets is different than the OTC markets of the pre-1964
period because trading occurs between investors who are deemed
accredited under the securities laws. 153 Nevertheless, there are doubts
about whether accredited investors are effective at fending for
themselves. 154 If it is true that accredited investors are ineffective at
fending for themselves, then increasing liquidity in the public markets
may only exacerbate the problem because it will allow them more
opportunities to trade. As a result, the Act would defeat the original
purpose of § 12(g), which was to require companies of a certain size
and with substantial trading volumes to be “‘public’ for purposes of
protection of the securities laws.” 155

IV. POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACT

Despite proponents of the Threshold Provision arguing that the §
12(g) 500 shareholder threshold impedes capital formation, 156 the
Threshold Provision will have unintended consequences, including
decreasing the number of companies going public. 157 The decrease will
inhibit capital formation and job growth because a majority of job
growth occurs after a company goes public whereby it experiences a
large influx of capital that it can use to expand business and hire more
employees. 158 Having a lower threshold for mandatory disclosure
forces more companies into the public markets, which helps to
maintain robust public markets.
When the markets are robust, “efficient pricing and funding of
entrepreneurial activity” occurs. 159 For example, companies that have
a price set on the open market attract more investors, while those that
are not on the open markets are traded at a discount of 30 percent or
more. 160 When a company is able to raise capital more efficiently, job
growth occurs more rapidly. 161 And, the efficient allocation of
152. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 17.
153. See Do I have to be an Accredited Investor to join SecondMarket?, SECONDMARKET,
http://support.secondmarket.com/entries/481382-do-i-have-to-be-an-accredited-investor-tojoin-second market (last visited Mar. 2, 2012).
154. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 32.
155. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34.
156. H.R. Rep. No. 112-327, at 2 (2011).
157. Deborah Gage, supra note 126.
158. IPO TASK FORCE, supra note 19, at 5.
159. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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resources creates a more productive economy. 162 In that regard,
legislation should encourage companies to go public to allow the
market to allocate capital to the best performing companies so they
can create long lasting economic growth.
Mandatory disclosure may also be in the best interest of
companies for capital formation because firms that choose to go public
benefit from lower capital costs.
When a company discloses
information to investors, it will prosper relative to others because
investors incur lower costs for searching out information on which to
base their investments. 163 However, as discussed in Part II, companies
generally are not incentivized to disclose information because they do
not internalize all of the social benefits derived from it. 164 As such,
firms generally will provide less information than it is socially optimal.
Therefore, without mandatory disclosure, companies will under
produce information. Nonetheless, if the purpose of the Act is to
reinvigorate the economy and enable job growth, a law that creates
strong incentives for companies to stay private will not accomplish
that goal. Congress should work to make the public markets more
attractive for startups as opposed to creating a superficial fix that
allows startups to avoid the public markets.
Policies that strengthen the public markets also benefit the public
at large by enabling democratic ownership and the rewards that come
with it. 165 When IPOs are delayed, the numbers of pre-IPO financing
rounds increase, and by the time that the public gets access to shares,
there is less upside. 166 The IPO market is already seeing this trend. For
example, for companies such as Microsoft (IPO in 1986), Cisco (IPO in
1990), and Amazon (IPO in 1997), public investors participated in 99
percent of the terminal value of the company. 167 However, in more
recent technology IPOs, private investors accrued most of the terminal
value. For example, Google’s pre-IPO value was $40 billion and
Facebook’s was $70 billion. 168
In part, tech companies are staying private longer because they
are able to raise huge financing rounds in what have been referred to
as “the public financing of twelve years ago.” 169 If companies are able

162. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3.
163. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 44, at 290.
164. Id. at 287; Zingales, supra note 59, at 19.
165. Written Testimony of Edward Knight, supra note 26, at 3.
166. Erick Schonfeld, Tech IPOs Just Ain’t What they Used to Be, AOL TECH. (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://techcrunch.com/2011/12/19/tech-ipos-bleh/.
167. William Quigley, A Venture Capital Revival Is Upon Us (Mar. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.slideshare.net/quigleyreport/quigley-report-a-venture-capital-revival-is-upon-us;
Schonfeld, supra note 165.
168. Quigley, supra note 167.
169. Schonfeld, supra note 166.
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to easily raise pre-IPO capital and have liquidity in the secondary
markets, they may be incentivized to stay private longer. As a result,
public investor confidence may diminish, and divestment of the public
markets may occur. Additionally, more companies may seek to list
their stocks on foreign exchanges. 170 Divestment resulting from lack of
investor confidence is an issue that the enactment of § 12(g) sought to
tackle in the first place. 171 Therefore, creating legislation that increases
the likelihood of public divestment runs contrary to public policy.
In sum, although increasing the § 12(g) mandatory registration
threshold has some benefits, that are drawbacks. The downsides
include increasing the time companies remain private and reducing the
number of companies that conduct IPOs. Part V recommends changes
to § 12(g) that would help reconcile the needs of private companies
with the policy objectives of mandatory disclosure.

V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In light of failure of § 12 (g) as an accurate size test and the
changes to the market landscape since § 12 (g) was originally enacted,
a new regulatory approach should be adopted. As discussed in Part II,
significantly raising the shareholder of record threshold promotes an
inaccurate size test that allows companies to have large numbers of
beneficial shareholders without being subject to the reporting
requirements of the 1934 Act. 172 However, when adopted, the SEC did
not contemplate that that the 500-shareholder threshold would force
private companies with illiquid stock to go public. The SEC simply
sought to reign in OTC trading. 173 Nevertheless, the rise of the
secondary markets has lead to a situation that is similar to the pre1964 period when shares of nonreporting companies were widely
traded. 174 Therefore, the § 12(g) mandatory disclosure rules should be
modified in order to balance the burdens on private companies—
which should not have to make a decision between hiring more
employees or going public—with the public interest benefits of
170. See Written Testimony of Edward S. Knight, supra note 26, at 3.
171. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at iv.
172. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & ADOLF A. BERLE, SPURRING JOB GROWTH THROUGH CAPITAL FORMATION
WHILE PROTECTING INVESTORS: HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN
AFFAIRS
12–13
(Dec.
1,
2011)
(written
testimony),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.Hearing&Hearing_ID=a96c1b
c1-b06 4-4b01-a8ad-11e86438c7e5. The current framework enables companies to go dark even
though they have over 500 beneficial shareholders. See discussion supra Part II.B.
173. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 10.
174. LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 17.
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mandatory disclosure. To that end, in order to fit with the original
purpose of §12(g), Congress should change the § 12(g) size standard to
better reflect trading volume and beneficial ownership.
Several alternatives to using the number of record shareholders
as a threshold have been suggested. 175 These include, counting the
number of beneficial shareholders, or moving to a public float or
market capitalization approach. 176 Either one of these would improve
upon the current approach. However, because the shareholders of
private and public companies are inherently different, as are the
markets in which they trade, meaningful regulation of the two can be
accomplished by creating a size test that reflects trading volume using
distinct criteria for the private and public spheres.
A. BENEFICIAL SHAREHOLDERS, PUBLIC FLOAT, OR MARKET CAP APPROACHES
Either a standard based on beneficial shareholders, public float, or
market capitalization would be an improvement to § 12 (g) mandatory
disclosure benchmark. 177 However, these approaches are not ideal.
First, by looking at the number of beneficial shareholders as a
benchmark for size, Congress could increase the pre-IPO shareholder
threshold that triggers mandatory disclosure and alleviate the
Facebook problem. 178 Simultaneously, basing the rule on beneficial
ownership would prevent public companies with large numbers of
beneficial shareholders from going dark.
However, while the
technology is likely available to track beneficial ownership in the
public markets, it may be difficult to do so in the private setting
because private companies are less regulated, and companies may
have difficulty tracking indirect holdings by way of institutional
investors. Therefore, in the private setting, record ownership is a more
practical approach because companies can more easily maintain
records of who has title to the securities.
Second, under a public float or market capitalization test, the SEC
would look to the value of the shares outstanding by nonaffiliates of
the company. 179 In effect, this would correlate more appropriately
with notions of creating an efficient market. 180 Additionally, it would
limit large companies from being able to go dark. However, market
capitalization could not be used as a threshold for private companies
175. Changing the size test is not an innovative concept. It has been recommended numerous
times. See, e.g., Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14; LANGEVOORT &
THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41; Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99.
176. Kanagawa Holdings LLC, supra note 99; Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note
91, at 14; LANGEVOORT & THOMSON, supra note 89, at 41.
177. LANGEVOORT & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41.
178. Id.
179. Written Testimony of John C. Coffee, Jr., supra note 91, at 14.
180. Id.
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because, without a competitive marketplace, it would be difficult to
accurately calculate the value of outstanding securities.

B. A TWO-TIERED APPROACH
Given that the private markets and public markets are inherently
different, they should be regulated in different ways. Therefore, a twotiered approach could be used that measures the size of private
companies and public companies based on different criteria. When
companies are private, the mandatory registration threshold could be
defined by both the number of record shareholders and trading
volume.
For the private sphere, the 500 record shareholder limit could be
increased to allow businesses to make hiring and acquisition decisions
without worrying about triggering the registration requirement. In
order to protect investors, the record shareholder increase could be
offset by restricting the volume of private trading. Just as the SEC’s
1964 Study based its size test on the correlation between the number
of shareholders and companies’ trading volumes, 181 § 12(g) could be
changed to reflect the volume of stocks trading on the secondary
markets. For example, privately traded companies could trade until a
certain volume limit, at which point they could be required to go
public. This would enable a larger incubation period while minimizing
the risk of fraud. Once in the public sphere, Congress could determine
whether a company can delist by setting a size limit based on beneficial
ownership, public float, or market capitalization. 182 This would help
avoid the issue of large companies with a significant number of
beneficial shareholders going dark. 183

181. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34.
182. See LANGEVOORT & THOMPSON, supra note 89, at 41. For companies that have gone public, a
size limit based on either beneficial, public float, or market capitalization would suffice. For the
purpose of my argument, conceptually, what is important is that the standards are different for
private companies and public companies.
183. At the time of the Study, using criteria based on market activity would not have been
workable in practice. H.R. Doc. No. 88-95, at 34. However, with modern technology criteria based
on market activity seems practical. With hi-tech trading platforms such as SecondMarket, it
should not be overly burdensome to calculate the trading volumes of particular companies in the
private market.
See Claims Trading Monthly: February 2012, SECOND MKT.,
https://www.secondmarket.com/discover/reports/ february-2012-claims-traded-monthly2 (last
visited Aug. 28, 2012) (indicating that SecondMarket can track the number of trades, as well as
other comprehensive data taking place on its platform).
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As it stood before the adoption of the Threshold Provision, § 12(g)
was out of step with the realities of the modern securities industry.
There was certainly a need to reform § 12(g). However, due to the way
the Threshold Provision is drafted, it fails to adequately resolve
fundamental problems with § 12(g). As a result, the Threshold
Provision will promote a dysfunctional standard for the mandatory
disclosure triggering requirements, and it will reduce the number of
companies that conduct IPOs. These unintended consequences can be
avoided by changing the § 12(g) criteria to reflect trading volumes and
beneficial ownership in the private and public spheres.

